Shifting the Main Event: The Documentary Evidence Exception Improperly Converts the Appellate Courts into Fact-Finding Tribunals by Cane, Thomas & Long, Kevin M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 77
Issue 3 Spring 1994 Article 7
Shifting the Main Event: The Documentary
Evidence Exception Improperly Converts the
Appellate Courts into Fact-Finding Tribunals
Thomas Cane
Kevin M. Long
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas Cane and Kevin M. Long, Shifting the Main Event: The Documentary Evidence Exception Improperly Converts the Appellate
Courts into Fact-Finding Tribunals, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 475 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol77/iss3/7
SHIFTING THE MAIN EVENT: THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
EXCEPTION IMPROPERLY
CONVERTS THE APPELLATE
COURTS INTO
FACT-FINDING TRIBUNALS
HONORABLE THOMAS CANE*
KEVIN M. LONG**
I. INTRODUCrION
Appellate standards of review define the roles of appellate courts.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, with complete discretion to take or not
to take cases, "act[s] primarily as a law-stating, law-developing court."'
In 1978, Wisconsin established the Court of Appeals to serve as an error-
correcting, case-deciding court.2 As the appellate court's standards of
review evolved, a "documentary evidence exception"3 to the "clearly er-
roneous" standard slowly emerged.4 This "standard" turns appellate
* Presiding Judge for District III Wisconsin Court of Appeals. B.B.A. 1961, University of
Michigan; S.D. 1964, Marquette University; LL.M. 1986, University of Virginia.
** Associate at Godfrey, Braun & Hayes, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. B.S. 1989, Marquette
University; J.D. and M.B.A. 1992, Marquette University.
1. William A. Bablitch, Court Reform of 1977: The Wisconsin Supreme Court Ten Years
Later, 72 MARO. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1988); see Wis. STAT. § 809.62(1) (1991-92).
2. See Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 5(3); see also Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107 n.3,
293 N.W.2d 155, 159 n.3 (1980).
3. This exception also has been referred to as a "physical evidence exception" by courts in
other jurisdictions. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). We refer to this
exception as the "documentary evidence exception" because that is how it has been referred
to in Wisconsin case law. Our arguments against the documentary exception are equally ap-
plicable to any "physical evidence" exception to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
4. When reviewing a trial court's factual findings, the appellate courts will not set aside
the findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Wis. STAT. § 805.17(2) (1991-92). The United
States Supreme Court has determined that a finding is clearly erroneous "when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (citing
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). In addition to Wis.
STAT. § 805.17(2), Wisconsin case law also has stated that findings of fact by the trial court will
not be upset on appeal unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence. Wisconsin courts have now merged these two standards, stating that "[w]hile we
now apply the 'clearly erroneous' test.., cases which apply the 'great weight and clear pre-
ponderance test' ... may be referred to for an explanation of this standard of review because
the two tests in this state are essentially the same." Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 641,
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courts into fact-finding tribunals, wastes judicial resources, and lengthens
the already arduous road to judicial finality. The United States Supreme
Court has rightfully noted that, with regard to fact finding, the trial court
should be the main event rather than a tryout on the road to determina-
tion in the appellate courts.5 We contend that utilization of the docu-
mentary evidence exception by the appellate courts improperly shifts the
fact-finding main event from its rightful venue-the trial court. In this
Article, we will (1) analyze the reasonableness standard of review that
we believe should govern questions to which the documentary evidence
exception is sometimes applied; (2) describe the evolution of the docu-
mentary evidence exception; and (3) propose that Wisconsin Statute sec-
tion 805.17(2) be amended to foreclose use of the exception and codify
the reasonableness standard of review for inferences drawn from the
facts by the trial court.6
II. REASONABLENESS STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR INFERENCES
Wisconsin courts have developed a standard of review for inferences
from facts that is at odds with the present documentary evidence excep-
tion to the clearly erroneous rule. We contend that the reasonableness
standard of review is the more appropriate standard when applying the
documentary evidence exception.
In Pfeifer v. World Service Life Ins. Co.,7 Judge Gartzke of the court
of appeals explained the reasonableness inquiry as follows:
Like the federal appellate courts, we apply the clearly errone-
ous standard when reviewing findings of fact by a trial court.
Section 805.17(2), Stats., provides that findings of fact by a trial
643, 340 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1983). Findings of fact made by a jury will be affirmed if
supported by any credible evidence. In a criminal case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
stated:
When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the test is whether
the evidence adduced, believed, and rationally considered by the jury was sufficient to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely stated, the test is
whether, when considered most favorably to the state and the conviction, the evidence
is so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that
no trier of facts acting reasonably could be convinced to that degree of certitude which
the law defines as "beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Koller, 87 Wis. 2d 253, 266, 274 N.W.2d 651, 658 (1979) (citations omitted).
5. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
6. For a general review of Wisconsin appellate standards of review, see Ronald R. Hofer,
Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 231 (1991); Jeff Leavell,
Appellate Review: Choosing and Shaping the Proper Standard, 60 Wis. B. BULL. 14 (Apr.
1987).
7. 121 Wis. 2d 567, 570, 360 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1984).
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court sitting without a jury or with an advisory jury "shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous .." The supreme court
adopted the "clearly erroneous" test in 1975, but has continued to
apply a reasonableness standard to inferences by the trial court.
We will continue to apply the reasonableness standard of review
to inferences by a trial court from undisputed or established facts,
unless the supreme court directs us to use another standard.
Whether an inference may reasonably be drawn from undis-
puted or established facts is a question of law. Deciding the rea-
sonableness of an inference is therefore a recognized appellate
function.
An appellate court must accept a reasonable inference drawn
by a trial court from established facts if more than one reasonable
inference may be drawn. If only one reasonable inference is
available, the drawing of that inference is a question of law. This
analysis is consistent with the constitutional limitations of the
court of appeals. According to Wurtz v. Fleischmann, the appel-
late jurisdiction conferred upon the court of appeals by art. VII,
sec. 5(3), of the Wisconsin Constitution precludes us "from mak-
ing any factual determinations where the evidence is in dispute."8
The Pfeifer analysis has been followed by numerous appellate
courts,9 and the supreme court has not directed the appellate courts to
use another standard. In fact, the supreme court's analysis is precisely
the analysis that was used in Pfeifer. In State v. Friday,10 the supreme
court wrote:
The drawing of an inference on undisputed facts when more
than one inference is possible is a finding of fact which is binding
upon an appellate court. It is not within the province of this court
8. Id. at 570-71, 360 N.W.2d at 67 (citations & footnote omitted). The Pfeifer language
cited contains a footnote stating: "See also State ex. reL Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis. 2d 225,241,258
N.W.2d 700,705 (1977) (when evidence is documentary, reviewing court is not bound by infer-
ences drawn by fact finder)." Id. at 571 n.1, 360 N.W.2d at 67 n.1. This implies that some
judges view the documentary evidence exception as an exception to the reasonableness stan-
dard, rather than as an alternative to it.
9. See County of Dane v. Norman, 168 Wis. 2d 675,680-81, 484 N.W.2d 367,369 (Ct. App.
1992); Blankenship v. Computers & Training, Inc., 158 Wis. 2d 702, 709-10, 462 N.W.2d 918,
921 (Ct. App. 1990); Haldemann v. Haldemann, 145 Wis. 2d 296, 307, 426 N.W.2d 107, 111
(CL App. 1988); State ex reL Vaughan v. Faust, 143 Wis. 2d 868, 871,422 N.W.2d 898,899 (Ct.
App. 1988); Spencer v. Spencer, 140 Wis. 2d 447,450,410 N.W.2d 629,630-31 (Ct. App. 1987);
State v. Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 321, 399 N.W.2d 917, 927 (Ct. App. 1986); Potts ex reL
Estate of Gavcus v. Garionis, 127 Wis. 2d 47,54,377 N.W.2d 204,207 (Ct. App. 1985); State ex
reL McCaffrey v. Shanks, 124 Wis. 2d 216, 235, 369 N.W.2d 743, 754 (Ct. App. 1985).
10. 147 Wis. 2d 359, 434 N.W.2d 85 (1989).
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or any appellate court to choose not to accept an inference drawn
by a fact finder when the inference drawn is a reasonable one."
Thus, the reasonableness inquiry for inferences drawn from undisputed
facts is solidly supported by Wisconsin case law.
The reasonableness inquiry directly conflicts with the documentary
evidence exception to the clearly erroneous rule. When an appellate
court encounters, as it often does, a finding made by a trial court that is
based solely on documents, the reasonableness inquiry calls for the ap-
pellate court to defer to the trial court's inference unless it is unreasona-
ble. However, the documentary evidence exception requires the
appellate court to redecide the question without deference to the trial
court.
12
III. DOCUMENTARY ExcErION TO FAcT-FINDING RULE
The documentary evidence exception to the clearly erroneous rule is
referred to in several published Wisconsin appellate opinions. Almost
all Wisconsin documentary exception opinions rely originally on Will of
Mechler, a 1944 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. 3 In Mechler, the
11. Id. at 370-71,434 N.W.2d at 89 (citing Onalaska Elec. Heating, Inc. v. Schaller, 94 Wis.
2d 493, 501, 288 N.W.2d 829, 833 (1980); Kessler v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 398, 400,
134 N.W.2d 412, 414 (1965)).
12. This situation occurred in Eau Claire Press Co. v. Gordon, 176 Wis. 2d 154, 499
N.W.2d 918 (Ct. App. 1993), an open records case in which the trial court decided on the basis
of documents before it that the filing of a mandamus action by a newspaper seeking certain
records was not the cause of the release of those records. The court of appeals reversed,
finding that the inference was not reasonable. Id. at 160-62, 499 N.W.2d at 920-21. After
much discussion, the court used the reasonableness inquiry rather than the documentary evi-
dence exception to the clearly erroneous rule. Id.
13. 246 Wis. 45, 16 N.W.2d 373 (1944) (referred to as "In re Mechler's Will" in regional
reporter). Cases that rely originally on Mechler include In re Hackbarth, 147 Wis. 2d 467, 472,
433 N.W.2d 266,268 (Ct. App. 1988) (through De Lap); Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ.
(Racine I), 145 Wis. 2d 518, 521, 427 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Ct. App. 1988) (through Sieloff);
Zurbuchen v. Teachout, 136 Wis. 2d 465, 471, 402 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Ct. App. 1987) (through
De Lap); Levy v. Levy, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 529, 388 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1986) (through Fisher);
State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 423 n.4, 316 N.W.2d 395,403-04 n.4 (1982) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting) (through De Lap and Vogt); Nosek v. Stryker, 103 Wis. 2d 633,638 n.5, 309 N.W.2d
868, 872 n.5 (Ct. App. 1981) (through De Lap); State ex reL Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis. 2d 225,
241,258 N.W.2d 700,705 (1977) (through De Lap and Tropic of Cancer); American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 58 Wis. 2d 299, 303,206 N.W.2d 152, 155 (1973) (through De Lap); De Lap
v. Institute of Am., Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 507, 510, 143 N.W.2d 476, 477 (1966) (through Tropic of
Cancer); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 148, 121 N.W.2d 545, 552-53 (1963)
(directly and through Vogt); Vogt, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 270 Wis. 315, 71 N.W.2d 359
(1955), on reh., 270 Wis. 321, 321i-321j, 74 N.W.2d 749, 754-55 (1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 284
(1957).
One appellate opinion, State v. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d 431,435, 378 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Ct. App.
1982), appears to stand on its own in putting forth the documentary evidence exception. In
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supreme court was determining the intent of a will. Because the rule of
this case is not easily apparent and is the genesis of the documentary
evidence exception, we will substantially repeat its language. The court
wrote:
In this case the court is called upon to deal with a written in-
strument [a will] in the light of circumstances as to which there is
no dispute. This presents a question of law and not of fact....
Generally, the rule applicable to findings of fact made by the
trial court does not apply where there are no disputed questions
of fact because the reason for the rule itself fails. (In a certain
class of cases inferences are said to be within the rule.) The rea-
son for the rule is that fact finding is primarily a function of the
trial court while on appeal this court deals mainly with questions
of law. The position of the trial court for the determination of
factual questions is obviously superior to that of the appellate
court, in that the trial court has an opportunity to observe the
witnesses, note their demeanor, the manner in which they testify,
their intelligence or lack of it, and many other intangible things
which it is impossible to place upon a court record. None of
these considerations apply to a determination of a court made
upon undisputed facts where the interpretation of a written in-
strument is under consideration. The reason for the rule failing,
the rule itself fails.
While it is true that in a sense the determination of an intent
of the maker of a written instrument from the instrument and the
surrounding conditions is a search for a fact (the purpose the
maker intended to manifest by the language used), the result is
arrived at by the application of legal principles or rules of con-
struction rather than by inferences drawn from known facts
although the consideration of such inferences may be involved in
the process. Under such circumstances the trial court is in no bet-
ter position to reach a correct conclusion than is the appellate
court. While the decision of the trial court in such cases is enti-
tled to consideration and weight, it does not have such persuasive
effect as does a conclusion reached solely by inferences drawn from
established facts. 4
Pepin, the appellate court was reviewing a discretionary determination of the trial court, a
decision to bar testimony as hearsay. The court applied what some commentators have re-
ferred to as a "better position" analysis to the question, see Hofer, supra note 6, at 237-38, and
concluded that because the evidence to be admitted was "documentary," and no demeanor
evidence attended it, the trial court was in no better position to determine the issue than the
appellate court. Thus, the appellate court visited the hearsay question anew. Pepin, 110 Wis.
2d at 435, 378 N.W.2d at 900.
14. Mechler, 246 Wis. at 55-56, 16 N.W.2d at 378 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1994]
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While the precise meaning of the Mechler decision is easily mistaken,
careful analysis of its language leads to the conclusion that the Mechler
court was not crafting an exception to the fact-finding standard of re-
view, but merely explaining the distinction and reasoning behind review
standards for questions of fact and those of law. The Mechler court
states that: (1) it is presented with a question of law (interpretation of a
will), (2) the trial court's legal determination is not arrived at "by infer-
ence drawn from known facts," and (3) the trial court's determination of
this question of law is not entitled to such persuasive effect as a conclu-
sion reached by a trial court from inferences drawn from established
facts.' 5 It is also apparent, at least as of the Mechler decision, that infer-
ences drawn from undisputed facts remain questions of fact.' 6
Mechler was followed by Vogt, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.'7 Vogt turned on whether picketing was conducted for an un-
lawful purpose. The trial court refused to find, as the plaintiff had ar-
gued, "[t]hat the picketing of plaintiff's premises [had] been engaged in
for the purpose of coercing, intimidating, and inducing the employer to
force, compel, or induce its employees to become members of the de-
fendant labor organizations ....
The appellate court found that "[t]he inference that the picketing was
conducted for an unlawful purpose [was] inescapable"' 9 and stated:
We are of the opinion that the court should have made the finding
requested by the plaintiff, and that, since the facts as to which the
request was made are undisputed and the inferences are only one
way, we should reverse for error in so refusing.20 If, however, we
15. As noted by the Mechler court, contract language interpretation involves applying
rules of construction rather than determining competing inferences and, therefore, is appro-
priately reviewed as a question of law. Id. at 55, 16 N.W.2d at 373.
16. The Mechler court identifies two independent reasons for deference to the trial court
in fact-finding situations. First, "fact finding is primarily a function of the trial court." Second,
the trial court is in a superior position for making factual determinations. Il The subtle
distinction between these two reasons is lost on many who consider reasons for deference to
the trial court, but should not be. The United States Supreme Court notes both reasons in
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
17. 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W.2d 749 (1956).
18. Id. at 321g, 74 N.W.2d at 753. This inference is equivalent to a finding that the picket-
ing was conducted for an unlawful purpose.
19. Id. at 321h, 74 N.W.2d at 754.
20. For this proposition, the Vogt court cites 5 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 1675. This sec-
tion, now at 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1675 (1993), states:
No question is presented for appellate review by the refusal of the trial court to find
incidental or evidentiary facts, and an appellate court will review only if the trial court
has refused to find ultimate facts as to which the evidence is uncontroverted and the
inferences are all only one way.
[Vol. 77:475
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may not do that, we are at liberty to and should supply the
finding. 21
The Vogt court then cited a Maine case, Pappas v. Stacey,22 as holding
that the clearly erroneous rule is not applicable in a case that involves no
oral testimony.23 Pappas relied on Mellen v. Mellen,24 which, like
Mechler, involved the interpretation of a will. In Mellen, the Maine ap-
pellate court ignored the argument that the trial court's finding of "testa-
mentary intent" was subject to the clearly erroneous rule. The appellate
court remarked that the claim had no merit in a case that involved no
oral testimony.-5
After reciting various maxims of Wisconsin appellate review, the
Vogt court quoted the Mechler language shown above.26 Referring to
Mechler, the Vogt court stated, "We see no distinction between the case
where the court is called upon to deal with or construe a written instru-
ment and where, as here, the court is required to study only pleadings
and affidavits."2 7 The Vogt court then independently reviewed the issue,
concluding that the picketing was conducted for an unlawful purpose
and that, therefore, the trial court properly enjoined it.
In his dissent, Justice Currie summarized the majority's standard of
review holding as follows:
Where a question of fact is presented on an appeal to this court as
to whether peaceful picketing was conducted for an unlawful ob-
jective, and no parol testimony had been taken before the trial
court but instead the proof in the record consists solely of affida-
vits or stipulated facts, this court is not concluded by findings of
the trial court based upon inferences drawn from such affidavits
or stipulated facts but is free to draw its own inferences from such
record.2
It is apparent that the Vogt court relied on Mechler and the Maine deci-
sion, Pappas, in crafting this rule.29 The Vogt rule crafts an exception in
21. Vogt, 270 Wis. at 321i, 74 N.W.2d at 754 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
22. 116 A.2d 497 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
23. Vogt, 270 Wis. at 321i, 74 N.W2d at 754.
24. 90 A.2d 818 (Me. 1952).
25. Id. at 820.
26. Vogt, 270 Wis. at 321i-321j, 74 N.W.2d at 754-55.
27. Id. at 321j, 74 N.W.2d at 755.
28. Id. at 321n, 74 N.W.2d at 757 (Currie, J., dissenting).
29. Note that numerous published opinions of both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals contradict this rule. See State v. Friday, 147 Wis. 2d 359, 370-71,
434 N.W.2d 85,89 (1989); Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ. Dist. 13 v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d
230, 240, 251 N.W.2d 41, 46 (1977); Pfeifer v. World Serv. Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 567, 570,
360 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1984).
19941
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cases where the record consists solely of affidavits or stipulated facts.
However, the basis for the exception is two cases (Mechler and Mellen
through Pappas) involving the interpretation of wills, which is a question
of law. Moreover, in light of the Vogt language stating that the inference
eventually drawn is "inescapable," and that "the inferences are all one
way," the more appropriate holding to take from the Vogt majority
should have been that the inference drawn by the trial court was
unreasonable.3 °
The documentary evidence exception first appeared in McCauley v.
Tropic of Cancer.3 In Tropic of Cancer, the supreme court was review-
ing a trial judge's determination regarding the sufficiency of a jury find-
ing of obscenity. The court noted the view that when a constitutional
protection is claimed, the judge or appellate court must make an in-
dependent review of the material to determine whether it is obscene.3"
The court also stated:
That a judgment of obscenity is not a fact issue of the ordinary
type is obvious. Issues of legal and constitutional interpretation
dominate the process of determination. Upon the one hand is the
desirability of according as much finality as is reasonable to deci-
sions of the tribunal of first instance, and on the other the unde-
sirability of a formula which puts the decision of one jury or one
judge upon a difficult constitutional issue beyond the reach of
reconsideration.33
The Tropic of Cancer court called attention to Massachusetts's reli-
ance upon the rule that where the evidence is documentary, the appel-
late court is not bound by the inferences drawn by the trial court. 4 The
supreme court cited Mechler and Vogt, stating "we have recognized a
30. In affirming the Vogt decision, the United States Supreme Court referred to the infer-
ence drawn by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 286 (1957).
31. 20 Wis. 2d 134, 148, 121 N.W.2d 545, 552-53 (1962).
32. Id. at 147-48, 121 N.W.2d at 552.
33. Id. at 148, 121 N.W.2d at 552.
34. Id. (citing Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d 328,329-
30 (Mass. 1962)). The Massachusetts "Tropic of Cancer" case cites Corkum v. Salvation Army
of Mass., Inc., 162 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Mass. 1959), which cites Malone v. Walsh, 53 N.E.2d 126,
129 (Mass. 1944), which cites Newburyport Soc'y for Relief of Aged Women v. Noyes, 192
N.E. 54, 55 (Mass. 1934). Noyes explained the rule relied upon in Tropic of Cancer as follows:
All the evidence is reported. There is little if any conflict in the testimony .... The
decision of the issues raised depends not upon the credibility of witnesses but upon
proper inferences from testimony not in substantial controversy and upon the gov-
erning principles of law. In these circumstances no deference is due to the decision of
the trial judge. It is the duty of this court to draw its own inferences, and to decide the
case according to its own judgment.
[Vol. 77:475
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similar rule."3 5 The court then undertook an independent review of the
book, deemed it not to be obscene, and reversed the trial court.36
Although the Tropic of Cancer court relied on a documentary evidence
exception, it could have looked anew at the obscenity determination
simply because it was a finding of constitutional fact.37
The fourth crucial case within the Mechler line is De Lap v. Institute
of America, Inc.3s In De Lap, Justice Heffernan noted, citing Tropic of
Cancer, that "in certain cases where the evidence is documentary, the
appellate court is not bound by inferences drawn therefrom by the trial
court."39 However, in De Lap, the court applied the general "contrary
to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence"4 standard
afforded factual findings. The court noted, "It is apparent that exhibits
that are the subject of so much conflicting testimony in regard to the
accepted practices of a trade are not of a nature that can be evaluated ab
initio by this court."'" Thus, although De Lap is often cited for holding
that when the evidence is documentary the appellate court need not de-
fer to the trial court, it is actually a decision in which the appellate court,
when confronted with documentary evidence, did defer to the trial court.
The Mechler line, which started innocently enough by explaining the
rationale behind the different standards of review for questions of law
Noyes, 192 N.E. at 55. This remains the law in Massachusetts. National Medical Care, Inc. v.
Zigelbaum, 468 N.E.2d 868, 872 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
35. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d at 148, 121 N.W.2d at 553.
36. Id. at 151, 121 N.W.2d at 554.
37. In questions of constitutional fact, the historical factual determination is reviewed as a
question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard, but the constitutional validity of
those facts is independently determined by the appellate court. Isiah B. v. State, 176 Wis. 2d
639, 500 N.W.2d 637, cerL denied, 114 S. Ct. 231 (1993); State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 345
N.W.2d 457 (1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Woods v. Clusen, 605 F. Supp. 890 (E.D.
Wis. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1986). The rationale for this review has been ex-
plained in State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 305-06, 128 N.W.2d 645, 655-56 (1964) (Wilkie, J.,
concurring) (in the context of the voluntariness of a confession) as follows:
The scope of constitutional protections, representing the basic value commitments of
our society, cannot vary from trial court to trial court, or from jury to jury. Reasonable
men can differ as to whether a given confession was voluntary. Whatever the ultimate
substantive dimension of these rights might be, they must be uniform throughout the
jurisdiction. This can be accomplished only if one decision maker has the final power
of independent determination. It is the task of this court to determine the voluntari-
ness of a confession by applying certain standards articulated by the United States
supreme court to the facts of the given case.
38. 31 Wis. 2d 507, 510, 143 N.W.2d 476, 477 (1966).
39. 1&
40. Id. at 511, 143 N.W.2d at 478. This is equivalent to the clearly erroneous standard.
See Hofer, supra note 6; Leavell, supra note 6.
41. De Lap, 31 Wis. 2d at 511, 143 N.W.2d at 478.
1994]
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and those of fact, has gradually been turned around to stand for a differ-
ent concept: "When the evidence to be considered is documentary,...
[appellate courts] need not give any special deference to the trial court's
findings."'42 This contradicts the well-established reasonableness stan-
dard of review of inferences drawn by the trial court from undisputed
facts.
IV. BECAUSE THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY Is THE BETTER VIEW,
SECTION 805.17(2) SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ELIMINATE
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE EXCEPTION
In a recent commentary,43 Ronald Hofer contends that appellate
standards of review should be determined by using a functional ap-
proach. Hofer writes:
We then may test a particular issue whose standard of review is
unknown by making several inquiries of it. Was the trial court's
determination dependent upon any of the following: (1) An as-
sessment of the credibility of any witnesses? (2) A weighing of
conflicting testimony? (3) A weighing of conflicting evidence?
and (4) The application of a statute within the particular expertise
of that tribunal? Negative answers to all these questions suggests
that the issue is one to which little deference should be paid-
conventionally, an issue of law. Affirmative answers to any of
these question suggest that the issue is one to which some defer-
ence should be paid-conventionally, one of fact.'
This approach is helpful when making the initial inquiry in determining
the appropriate appellate court standard of review. However, one must
be careful in applying the functional approach when dealing with undis-
puted evidence if the parties disagree as to the factual inference to be
drawn from this evidence.
Notwithstanding its limitations, however, application of the func-
tional approach shows that the reasonableness inquiry is a better rule
than the documentary evidence exception. The third question of the
functional approach is dispositive. If a trial court makes a decision solely
on the basis of documents, is that determination dependent upon a
weighing of conflicting evidence? The answer is yes if the documents or
portions of a single document conflict. Analysis then turns to what con-
stitutes documents or portions of documents that conflict. We submit
42. Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 145 Wis. 2d 518,521, 427 N.W.2d 414,416 (Ct.
App. 1988).
43. Hofer, supra note 6.
44. Id. at 242.
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that documents that conflict are not limited merely to documents that
state polar opposites. The proper test to determine whether documents
conflict is whether they give rise to two competing reasonable infer-
ences. Thus, the reasonableness inquiry is consistent with the functional
approach. If two reasonable competing inferences can be drawn from
the documents, then the court's decision of which inference to adopt is
based upon a weighing of conflicting evidence. Conversely, the docu-
mentary evidence exception is inconsistent with the functional approach
because it grants no deference to the trial court in situations where the
court's underlying determination depends on a weighing of evidence.
Moreover, the advent of video technology in the courts displays the
fallacy of the documentary evidence exception. The premise of the ex-
ception is that where the appellate court is in as good of a position as the
trial court to decide a matter, it should give the trial court's decision no
deference. Some states, most notably Kentucky, have begun videotaping
court proceedings in place of stenography.4 5 In at least one case, Wis-
consin trial proceedings were reduced to videotape.46 In instances where
the relevant portion of a trial court proceeding is reduced to videotape
that is available to the appellate court, the appellate court is arguably in
as good of a position as the trial court to observe the demeanor and to
judge the credibility of witnesses. If, as the documentary evidence ex-
ception holds, the sole reason for deference to the trial court is that it is
in a better position to make the call, then video technology would eclipse
all deferential standards of review.
Surely, it should not. It should not because a second independent
reason for deference to trial courts on fact-finding matters exists. We
defer to trial court fact finding because our system of justice has right-
fully determined that the trial courts will fulfill that function. Over time,
they develop an expertise in fact finding that eludes the appellate courts,
which deal primarily with issues of law. Also, it becomes a waste of judi-
cial resources and postpones finality when the appellate court reviews
factual findings de novo. This independent rationale for deference is vio-
lated by the documentary evidence exception.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the shortcomings
of the documentary evidence exception. In Anderson v. Bessemer City,4 7
45. See Robert F. Stephens, Kentucky Courts Go Video, 9 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 359
(1986).
46. Vandervelden v. Victoria, 177 Wis. 2d 243,502 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App.), rev. denied, 505
N.W.2d 137, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388 (1993).
47. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
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the Court addressed the issue of a "documentary evidence" exception to
the federal clearly erroneous rule.4 1 Justice White commented on ap-
pellate court review of trial court decisions based solely on documentary
evidence as follows:
If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may
not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as
the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact
finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
This is so even when the district court's findings do not rest on
credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts. To be sure,
various Courts of Appeals have on occasion asserted the theory
that an appellate court may exercise de novo review over findings
not based on credibility determinations. This theory has an im-
pressive genealogy... but it is impossible to trace the theory's
lineage back to the text of Rule 52(a), which states straightfor-
wardly that "findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous." .. . Rule 52(a) "does not make exceptions or purport
to exclude certain categories of factual findings from the obliga-
tion of a court of appeals to accept a district court's findings un-
less clearly erroneous."
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not
limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make de-
terminations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the de-
termination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role
comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court
of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accu-
racy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial
resources. In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already
been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on persuad-
ing the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one;
requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level
is requiring too much. As the Court has stated in a different con-
text, the trial on the merits should be "the 'main event. . . rather
than a 'tryout on the road.'" For these reasons, review of factual
findings under the clearly-erroneous standard-with its deference
to the trier of fact-is the rule, not the exception.4 9
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Section 805.17(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes is based on Federal
Rule 52. See Wis. STAT. § 805.17 (1991-92) (1974 Judicial Council Committee Note).
49. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-75 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
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Justice White's words highlight an important distinction that is often
lost on those who observe and practice before appellate courts. The rea-
sons for deference to the fact finder are not merely limited to the fact
finder's ability to experience firsthand the witnesses' testimony. They
also include the trial court's expertise at fact finding and significant con-
siderations of judicial economy and legal access. With the current back-
log at both the trial and appellate levels, the documentary evidence
exception can delay for years a factual finding upon which a litigant can
rely. All too often this justice delayed is justice denied.
Shortly after the Anderson decision, Congress amended Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a) to clarify its intent.50 The federal statute now
provides that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credi-
bility of the witnesses."'5 1 Regarding its judgment of the arguments for
and against the documentary evidence exception, the Advisory Commit-
tee stated:
The principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching
appellate review of findings by the district court based solely on
documentary evidence is that the rationale of Rule 52(a) does not
apply when the findings do not rest on the trial court's assessment
of credibility of the witnesses but on an evaluation of documen-
tary proof and the drawing of inferences from it, thus eliminating
the need for any special deference to the trial court's findings.
These considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the
stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recog-
nizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be
the finder of the facts. To permit courts of appeals to share more
actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the
legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply
appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues,
and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.52
Thus, both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have rejected
the documentary evidence exception to the clearly erroneous rule.
The Wisconsin courts should follow the federal courts. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, through the Judicial Council, should amend Wiscon-
50. Anderson apparently did not have an impact on Congress's action, because it is not
cited in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1985 amendment, and those notes state that
"[t]he Supreme Court has not clearly resolved the issue." Thus, both Congress and the Court
independently rejected the documentary evidence exception in 1985.
51. FED. R. Cv. P. 52(a).
52. Id. (Advisory Committee Notes-1985 Amendment).
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sin Statute section 805.17(2) to permanently banish the documentary
evidence exception to the annals of legal trivia. At the same time, the
council and supreme court should clarify the role of appellate courts
through codification of the reasonableness standard of review set forth
in Friday and Pfeifer.
Section 805.17(2) presently reads as follows:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advi-
sory jury, the court shall find the ultimate facts and state sepa-
rately its conclusions of law thereon. The court shall either file its
findings and conclusions prior to or concurrent with rendering
judgment, state them orally on the record following the close of
evidence or set them forth in an opinion or memorandum of deci-
sion filed by the court. In granting or refusing interlocutory in-
junctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Re-
quests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a referee
may be adopted in whole or part as the findings of the court. If
an opinion or memorandum of decision is fied, it will be suffi-
cient if the findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law appear
therein. If the court directs a party to submit proposed findings
and conclusions, the party shall serve the proposed findings and
conclusions on all other parties not later than the time of submis-
sion to the court. The findings and conclusions or memorandum
of decision shall be made as soon as practicable and in no event
more than 60 days after the cause has been submitted in final
form.
53
We propose that the emphasized sentence should be replaced by the fol-
lowing two sentences:
Findings of fact, including those based solely on documentary or
physical evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses; inferences drawn by the
trial court from the facts shall not be set aside unless they are
unreasonable.
We believe that these changes will help focus the appellate courts on
their proper role and will produce a more responsive legal system.
53. Wis. STAT. § 805.17(2) (1991-92) (emphasis added).
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